The Role of International Investment Law in Renewable Energy Investment; focus on Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) Contracts by Adetiloye, Idowu Adejoke
  
 
 
 
The Role of International Investment Law in 
Renewable Energy Investment; Focus on Build 
Operate and Transfer (BOT) Contracts 
 
 
 
Candidate number:  8007 
Supervisor: Catherine Banet 
Submission deadline: May 15, 2014 
Number of words: 16,573 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ...................................................................................................3 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................5 
1.1. Literature Review ................................................................................................................7 
1.2. Methodology .......................................................................................................................9 
2. RENEWABLE ENERGYAND BOT CONTRACTS ................................................................. 10 
2.1. Need for Increase in Renewable Energy Generation ........................................................... 10 
2.2. Build Operate and Transfer ................................................................................................ 12 
2.3. Risks in BOT ..................................................................................................................... 15 
2.3.1. Political and Regulatory Risk ..................................................................................... 15 
2.3.2. Financial risk ............................................................................................................. 16 
2.3.3. Technical risks ........................................................................................................... 17 
3. PROTECTION OFFERED BY INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW .............................. 18 
3.1. International Investment Agreements ................................................................................. 19 
3.2. The Protections .................................................................................................................. 21 
3.3. General Standards of treatment .......................................................................................... 21 
3.3.1. Fair and equitable treatment (FET) ............................................................................. 21 
3.3.2. Most Favored Nation Treatment (MFN) ..................................................................... 23 
3.3.3. National Treatment .................................................................................................... 25 
3.3.4. Full Protection and Security ....................................................................................... 25 
3.3.5. Transfer of funds........................................................................................................ 26 
3.4. The Umbrella Clause ......................................................................................................... 27 
3.4.1. The Principle of Attribution ....................................................................................... 28 
3.5. Expropriation .................................................................................................................... 30 
3.5.1. Police Powers versus Legitimate Expectations ........................................................... 31 
3.6. Exemption Clauses (Non-precluded measures)................................................................... 36 
3.6.1. Case Discussion (Argentina Cases) and application to BOT ....................................... 37 
4. WHEN IT GOES WRONG: CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY ICSID .................................... 40 
4.1. Lack of Consistency in ICSID Jurisprudence ..................................................................... 42 
4.2. Enforcement of ICSID Award............................................................................................ 43 
5. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 45 
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 46 
6.1. Cases ................................................................................................................................. 46 
6.2. Articles .............................................................................................................................. 47 
6.3. Books ................................................................................................................................ 51 
6.4. Agreements, Treaties and Conventions .............................................................................. 51 
6.5. Reports .............................................................................................................................. 52 
 
3 
 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
BIICL  British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
BIT  Bilateral Investment Treaty 
BOO  Build Own Operate 
BOOT  Build Own Operate Transfer 
BOT  Build Operate Transfer 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
DBO  Design Build Operate 
ECT  Energy Charter Treaty 
ESMAP Energy Sector Management Assistance Program 
EU  European Union 
FET  Fair and Equitable Treatment 
FWCC  First World Climate Conference 
GHG  Green House Gas 
ICC  International Chamber of Commerce 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
ICSID  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
IIA  International Investment Agreement 
IIL  International Investment Law 
ILC  International Law Commission 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IPP  Independent Power Project 
LCIA  London Court of International Arbitration 
LDO  Lease Develop Operate 
MFN  Most Favored Nation 
MIGA  Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
NAFTA North America Free Trade Area 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PARA  Paragraph 
4 
 
PCA  Permanent Court of Arbitration 
PPA  Power Purchase Agreement 
SIEL  Society for International Economic Law 
TDM  Transnational Dispute Management 
UN  United Nations 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework  Convention on  Climate Change 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Agency 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
UNICTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
USA  United States of America 
VS  Versus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the fourth assessment of the intergovernmental panel on climate change, 
sustainable investment flows and effective technology transfer are needed to achieve 
greenhouse gas emission (GHG) reduction, at a significant scale.
1
 Renewable energy has been 
known for its ability to produce low GHG emission.
2
 Hence, the need for investment and 
technology transfer in this energy sector. Renewable energy is energy derived from natural 
processes that are replenished constantly.
3
 Its sources include solar, wind, biomass, 
geothermal and hydropower. 
Renewable energy has also been seen as an instrument for sustainable development. It 
contributes to the sustainable development goals.
4
 In the developing countries, it provides 
access to energy, creates employment opportunities and reduces the cost of energy import. 
While in the developed ones, it helps to provide energy security, mitigate carbon emissions 
and provide new jobs.
5
 Technologies such as solar, wind, and small-scale hydropower have 
been found to be ideal for rural areas where the people have no access to the grid.
6
 
Most of the developing countries lack the technical know-how, the time and capital to 
commence renewable energy project hence the need to attract foreign investors in this area.
7
 
The just concluded EU-Africa summit, the World Bank clean energy fund and Japan‟s cool 
earth partnership depicts the developed countries‟ willingness to facilitate investment in 
renewable energy in developing countries
8
. However, lack of stable regulatory framework and 
other existing policies have made the developing countries unattractive to investors.
9
 Hence, 
one of the ways of attracting foreign investors is to make their country investor friendly by 
                                                             
1Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change. Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K. and Reisinger, A. (Eds.)combact climate change IPCC, 
Geneva, Switzerland. Pg68 
 http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf 
2Panwar, N. L., S. C. Kaushik, and Surendra Kothari. "Role of renewable energy sources in environmental 
protection: a review." Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 15.3 (2011): 1513-1524.Greenhouse gases 
emissions are gases that trap heat in the atmosphere and make the earth warmer 
3http://www.iea.org/topics/renewables/ 
4
Sathaye, J., et al. "Renewable energy in the context of sustainable development." Special Report on 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change. Geneva, Switzerland, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, http://srren. ipcc-wg3. de/report (2011).Pg 710. The goals are social and economic development, 
energy access, energy security, climate change mitigation and reduction of environmental and health impacts 
5 Ibid pg718 
6 Ibidpg 722-724 
7
 For example Nigeria, SouthAfrica, Malaysia 
8
Aaron Cosbey, Jennifer Ellis, Mahnaz Malik and Howard Mann; Clean Energy Investment Project synthesis 
report  July 2008.http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/cei_synthesis.pdf; http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/ 
9
Aaron Cosbey, Jennifer Ellis, Mahnaz Malik and Howard Mann; Clean Energy Investment Project synthesis 
report  July 2008. http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/cei_synthesis.pdf 
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making policies which will draw investors to this area. This involves public private 
partnership agreement between the investor and the government.  One of such type of 
agreement is the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) contract.  
BOT contracts entail granting of concession to an investor to build and operate a project for a 
particular period of time after which such project is handed over to the host state.
10
 The BOT 
contract‟s duration ranges from 5 to 30 years. However, such investments are trailed with 
risks. One of such risks is change in policies when substantial resources have been spent on 
the investment.  These risks sometimes affect return on investment.  Investors analyze and 
assess these risks and challenges before embarking on projects. They seek guarantees from 
government, favourable contractual terms and stabilization clauses to help in mitigating these 
risks. 
The main focus of International Investment Law‟s (IIL) is protection of foreign investment. It 
comprises of law that deals with international investments agreements (be it bilateral or 
multilateral). IIL through the provisions in the investment agreement provides a more secure 
investment environment. The existence of these enforceable protections can encourage 
investors‟ willingness to invest. IIL provisions also reduce cost of investment. The protections 
against political risk negate the need for very expensive political risk insurance. It reduces the 
risk associated with such investments thereby making it more financially attractive.
11
 In 
addition, it provides a neutral frame work for settlement of dispute.   
While the positive impacts of IIL have been applied generally; this thesis will be more 
specific by considering the impact of IIL on BOT type of contracts used in renewable energy 
projects. 
In the BOT, the operation period is the time an investor is expected to recoup his capital and 
gets a considerable return on his investment. At this period, change in the governmental 
supporting schemes or the regulatory framework can adversely affect the returns. Can the 
government be held responsible for this shortcoming? What if the changes were necessary and 
it lasts throughout the operation period? What is the role of international investment law in 
                                                             
10Kumaraswamy, M. M., & Zhang, X. Q. (2001). Governmental role in BOT-led infrastructure development. 
International Journal of Project Management, 19(4), 195-205. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0263-
7863(99)00069-1 
11Sussman, Edna, Energy Charter Treaty's Investor Protection Provisions: Potential to Foster Solutions to Global 
Warming and Promote Sustainable Development. ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 14, 
Spring 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090261pg 9-11 
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mitigating these risks in view of the challenges attributed to dispute settlement process under 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)? 
The main purpose of this thesis is to show that risks associated with BOT contracts 
investments in renewable energy can be mitigated through protection offered by international 
investment law. 
 
1.1. Literature Review 
Scholars have argued on the positive and negative effect IIL principles might have on 
renewable energy project. Among those who argued on the seemly negative role are the co-
authors Jacob Werksman, Kevin A. Baumert, and K. NavrozDubash in the article: “Will 
International Investment Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies.” 12  The publication 
examines the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the authors argued that the 
principles in the Kyoto protocol conflicts with that of the basic principles in International 
Investment Agreement (IIA) standards. One of the basic principles they highlighted is the 
non-discrimination standard. The application of Kyoto protocol standards between non-parties 
and parties might lead to discrimination against investment in CDM-related projects. 
Kate Miles
13
 also argues that investment law principles will have a regulatory chill effect on 
effort of government to reduce carbon emissions. She discussed this point through decided 
cases where environmental regulations made by the state were alleged to be against 
investment law principles. She advocated for alignment of the objectives of environmental 
law and investment law. 
However, these fears have been laid to rest by other authors who argued in favour of IIL. 
They claimed IIL play significant role in mitigating risks involved in renewable energy 
investment. 
Anatole  Boute in the article --“The potential contribution of international investment 
protection law to combat climate change”  argued that international protection laws would not 
                                                             
12Werksman, Jacob, Kevin A. Baumert, and Navroz K. Dubash. "Will International Investment Rules Obstruct 
Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of the Clean Development Mechanism."International 
Environmental Agreements 3.1 (2003): 59-86. 
13Miles, K. (2008). International investment law and climate change: issues in the transition to a low carbon 
world. Paper presented at the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference 
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prevent the governments from making the necessary regulation in line with their commitment 
to reducegreenhouse gas emissions via the Kyoto protocol. According to him, it will instead 
protect the investors in low carbon projects especially in developing countries and countries 
that have economies in transitions where there are high risks of regulatory change.  He 
postulated further that breach of fair and equitable treatment is not an absolute right in case of 
dispute on limits in carbon emissions to an investor in carbon intensive investment. This was 
reiterated through the Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic Partial Award
14
 where 
the tribunal held that 
„No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
investment is made remain totally unchanged. In order to determine whether frustration of the 
foreign investor‟s expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State‟s legitimate right 
subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into 
consideration as well‟ 
The same author in subsequent article,”Combating Climate Change through Investment 
Arbitration”15, analyzed through decided cases how international investment provisions can 
help to mitigate the risks encountered by low carbon investors. This literature focused on the 
basic substantive provisions of IIAs which included; protection against expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment, national treatment and umbrella clauses. He analysedthe procedure for 
incurring project on trade of greenhouse emissions credits (CDM) in a host country and he 
concluded that although investment protection laws are not absolute, it could go a long way in 
helping to mitigate the income based approach risk of climate change. 
Furthermore, Stephan W. Schil in his article - “Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State 
Regulation to Mitigate Climate Change?”16argued that investment treaties will not prevent 
government from taking general measures necessary for environmental protection. He further 
postulated that such measures should be non-discriminatory, proportionately balance the 
interest of investors and that of protecting the environment, and conform to due process. He 
stipulated that liability accorded by the tribunal in the notorious case of Metalclad
17
 is not 
based on regulatory takings but on assurances given by the Mexican government-legitimate 
expectation. Legitimate expectation is not an absolute right of the investor.  
                                                             
14
Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic Partial Award, 17 March 2006para 306 
15
Boute, Anatole. ”Combating Climate Change through Investment Arbitration.” Fordham Int’l LJ 35 (2011):613 
16Schill, Stephen W. ”Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to Mitigate Climate Change? 
Journal of International Arbitration. 24(5), pg 469-477 
17Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of August 30, 2000, para. 103 
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These authors have applied the investment law standards generally. This thesis will focus on 
BOT type of contract and examine if the IIL standards can be of help to investors involved in 
this type of project. 
 
1.2. Methodology 
McConville and Chui clearly explain what legal research entails.
18
According to these writers, 
legal research is either doctrinal or non-doctrinal. They characterise doctrinal legal research as 
the kind of legal research which takes the law as an internal self-sustaining set of principles 
which can be accessed through reading court judgements and statutes with little or no 
reference to the world outside the law.
19
 Richard Posner adds that doctrinal legal research is 
the task that extracts doctrine from a line of cases or from statutory text, re-states it, criticise it 
or extend it for sensible results in legal principles and common sense, using logic, analogy, 
judicial decisions and legal principles.
20
 To a large extent, the approach preferred for the 
present study is predominantly doctrinal. This is because the topic chosen for this study 
involves more of the use and analyses of primary sources of law.  
Investment protections are found in International investment agreement either bilateral or 
multilateral. I used protection standards in both bilateral and multilateral investment treaties 
with the aid of decided cases to illustrate how BOT Risks can be mitigated. Most of these 
decided cases will be cases arbitrated through ICSID and UNICITRAL rules. In addition, I 
will analyze some of the decided cases on the recent economic emergency in Argentina. The 
Argentina cases were used because they provide recent decisions made by tribunals on non- 
precluded measures. The ICSID Convention will also be used while analyzing the 
shortcomings of ICSID.  The Articles on „Responsibility of States for International Wrongful 
Acts”21will also be used to illustrate state responsibilities with regards to foreign investment. 
The secondary sources will include books, articles and commentaries. 
Most of the cases used in this thesis are not based on renewable energy projects. This is 
because BOT investments in renewable energy, associated with reduction of GHG emission, 
are still at its early stage.  
                                                             
18
 M McConville and W Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in M McConville and W Hong Chui (eds), 
Research Methods in Law (Edinburg, Edinburg University Press 2007) 1.  
19 Ibid    
20
Richard Posner, ‘Legal Scholarship Today’ (2002) 115:5 Har.L.Rev 1316 
21Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 
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2. RENEWABLE ENERGYAND BOT CONTRACTS 
A paper prepared by the UNFCC in 2007 shows that in order to return global emissions to 
current levels by 2030, mitigating measures would require global financial flow and 
investments of about USD 200-210 billion per annum by 2030.
22
 Achieving the financial flow 
will require cooperation between the government and private investors. This chapter will 
address the need for renewable energy, the involvement of private investors through BOT 
contract and the risks associated with the contract. 
2.1. Need for Increase in Renewable Energy Generation 
In the 1970s, series of conferences were convened by the United Nations where change in 
climate and its impacts on the human society were of concern.
23
 It has been known that this 
change is caused by CO2 and other greenhouse emissions resulting largely from combustion 
of fossil fuel for energy.
24
 This change can bring about disasters if not curbed on time.  
Recently, scientists have predicted that storms, flood and heat waves, rise in global 
temperatures and rising sea levels will be more frequent and intense.
25
 
Efforts have been made by the world at large to decrease greenhouse emission through 
reduction in fuel consumption and focus on use of energy source that produces zero or low 
level of carbon emissions.
26
  Various agreements have been made from time to time. The 
Kyoto protocol however has been the only binding agreements under public international law 
while the other agreements like voluntary emission reduction are voluntary as it is called.
27
 
The protocol commits about 37 countries with the EU to reduce their gas emission by 5% 
from 2008-2012.
28
 
 Under the UNFCCC Treaty, countries must meet their targets primarily through national 
measures. However, the Kyoto Protocol offers them an additional means of meeting their 
                                                             
22
 Investment and financial flows to address climate change. UNFCC Report 2007pg 
72www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/gpicc/iffacc.pdf 
23 https://www.wmo.int/pages/themes/climate/international_wcc.php#a,the United Nations Conference on 
Environment, Stockholm, 1972,the UN World Food Conference, Rome, 1974,First World Climate Conference 
(FWCC) 1979. 
24
Renewable energy and climate change by Godfrey Bevan, Significance,Volume 9, Issue 6, pages 8–12, 
December 2012( Wiley online Library)  
25  World Outlook Energy Report 2013: Redrawing the energy Climate map ;found at 
http://www.iea.org/media/freepublications/2013pubs/WEO2013_Climate_Excerpt_ES_WEB.pdf 
26
 Renewable energy and climate change by Godfrey Bevan, Significance,Volume 9, Issue 6, pages 8–12, 
December 2012( Wiley online Library), 
27Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:Article 2; can be found at 
https://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php.  
28Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; Article 3 
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targets by way of three market based mechanisms.
29
 These market based mechanisms are the 
clean development, emission trading and joint implementation. The mechanisms stimulate 
development through technology transfer and investment and encourage private sector‟s 
participation.
30
 The protocol also recognized the need for developed country to provide funds 
to the developing countries to help them in paying for incremental cost that they will incur 
during the change to clean and low carbon emission energy. 
The first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol was deemed to end in year 2012. 
However, through an amendment to the protocol, it was extended to 2020 at the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference 2012 held on 8
th
 of December in Doha, Qatar. The 
conference also agreed that a new agreement will come up in 2020 which will bind both 
developed and developing nations.
31
 
Energy conservation and efficiency, nuclear and carbon capture and storage, fossils fuel 
switching and renewable energy are various options to combat climate change; but renewable 
energy has been seen to be more efficient.
32
 
Renewable energy has also been seen as an instrument for sustainable energy.  Proper 
implementation of it could contribute to social and economic development, secure energy 
supply, energy access and reduced negative impact on health and environment.
33
 
Accessibility of energy especially electricity to the people in the rural areas have been the 
concern of the world at large. ESMAP estimates that about 1.4billion people lack access to 
electricity.
34
 The World Bank has initiated several projects to help developing countries in 
alleviating this challenge.
35
Connecting the rural areas to main grid is costly and time-
consuming, because they are widely scattered and far from the main grid. Hence, the need for 
                                                             
29 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Article 12 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php (these mechanisms create the carbon 
market) 
30ibid 
31
The amendment was made by decision 1\CMP.8 , pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 9, in accordance with 
article 20 and 21 of the Kyoto Protocol.( FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1) 
 Can be found at https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kp_doha_amendment_english.pdf 
32
Mitigating Climate change. “IPCC special report on renewable energy sources and climate change mitigation.” 
(2011) 
33Mitigating Climate change. “IPCC special report on renewable energy sources and climate change mitigation.” 
(2011) pg 3 
34
 http://www.esmap.org/Energy_Access 
35Reiche, Kilian, Alvaro Covarrubias and Eric Martinot. Expanding Electricity Access to Remote Areas: Off-Grid 
Rural Electrification in Developing Countries. Fuel 1.1.2 (2000)  1-4. 
 https://www.esmap.org/sites/esmap.org/files/ESME_ESMAPCambodia.pdf 
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off grid means of providing electricity. Studies have revealed that forms of renewable energy 
like solar energy (solar home system) can help in meeting these needs if the necessary 
strategies are used.
36
 At the initial stage, small scale renewable might require high cost 
finance. However, in the long run, it pays off as most of these small scale based renewables 
are located in the rural areas, where it allows for large scale development via production of 
stable power.
37
 
In order to facilitate the use of renewable energy, governments have involved themselves in 
public -private partnership. This connotes a partnership between the government and private 
individuals (investors) to provide clean energy and to meet up with the need to develop and 
provide infrastructure in the rural areas. The involvement of private investors could be in 
various forms.  It could be as Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) contract, Build Own Operate 
and Transfer (BOOT) contract, Build Own Operate (BOO) contract, Build Transfer Operate 
(BTO) contract, Buy Build Operate (BBO), Lease Develop Operate (LDO) Design Build Own 
(DBO)
38
, and Concessions.   
 
2.2. Build Operate and Transfer 
Build, operate and transfer (BOT) is a model wherein the private investors are allowed to 
participate in public enterprise through a concession given by the government. The three 
phases of „Building‟, Operating‟ and „Transfer‟ follows each other sequentially. In building 
phase, the private investors construct, design and finance a certain infrastructure. The 
operating phase entails: management and maintenance of the infrastructure; delivery of 
products and services; receiving of payment for investment cost; and making a margin of 
profit for a particular period by the investors. The last phase of Transfer involves handing 
over the infrastructure to the government after the period of concession expires, at no cost.
39
 
                                                             
36
Martinot, Eric, and Kilian Reiche. Regulatory approaches to rural electrification and renewable energy: case 
studies from six developing countries. World Bank, Washington, DC, Working Paper (2000) 
37Hain, J.J., et al. “Additional renewable energy growth through small-scale community oriented energy 
policies. Energy Policy 33.9 (2005): 1199 - 1212 
38
Yang, Jyh-Bin, Chi-Cheng Yang, and Chih-Kuei Kao. "Evaluating schedule delay causes for private participating 
public construction works under the Build-Operate-Transfer model." International Journal of Project 
Management 28.6 (2010): 569-579. 
39
Kumaraswamy, M. M., and X. Q. Zhang."Governmental role in BOT-led infrastructure 
development." International Journal of Project Management 19.4 (2001): 195-205. 
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The use of BOT can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s.
40
 However, the use of 
concessions is dated back to the 1700s when concession for water distribution was granted to 
the Perier Brothers in Paris.
41
 Governments allow private participation in the provision of 
infrastructure. This is to enable the use of private expertise, technical know-how, capital and 
management to increase efficiency and reduce cost involved in construction, completion, 
operation and maintenance.
42
 Concessions can be granted to both local and foreign private 
investors. The Government who grants the concession is the host government in case of a 
foreign investor. The concession is granted through a contract.  The operation period covers 
the time needed for the private investor to recuperate the capital invested into the venture 
through the revenue generated from the operation of the investment.  The BOT enables 
government to provide infrastructure to the public without incurring large public expenditure 
or borrowing.
43
 It also provides a new opening for private investors to contribute to world 
economic development.
44
 It facilitates transfer of technology. In most cases, the government 
may be the only customer or be determined to purchase a particular portion of the output in 
order to ensure the recouping of capital used on such investment.
45
 The primary feature of 
BOT is private financing. The private investor is responsible for providing the funds to 
develop and operate the project.
46
 BOT is used mostly in power sector, water treatments, dam, 
irrigation, sewage, telecommunication infrastructure.
47
 
In power sector, it involves the Independent Power Project model (IPP) which is used due to 
increase in demand for power. The IPP is mostly used in developing nations where the 
government decides the resource allocation.
48
 A good example is in Uganda where the 
                                                             
40Privatized infrastructure, the BOT approach, Edited by C walker and AJ Smith. 
41
Privatized infrastructure, the BOT approach, Edited by C walker and AJ Smith. 
42Henrik M. Inadomi. Independent power projects in developing countries: legal investment protection and 
consequences for development. Vol. 7.Kluwer Law International, 2010.Pg 41 
43 Yeo, K. T., and Robert LK Tiong."Positive management of differences for risk reduction in BOT 
projects." International Journal of Project Management 18.4 (2000): 257-265. 
44ibid 
45 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/botcontract.asp 
46Prof. Drs. Ir. Sebastiaan C.M. Menheere,Prof. Spiro N. Pollalis, Dipl. Eng., SM., MBA, Ph.D:Case Studies On 
Build Operate Transfer .found at http://www.gsd.harvard.edu/images/content/5/3/538865/fac-pub-pollalis-
bot-part-1.pdf 
47Auriol, Emmanuelle, and Pierre M. Picard. "A theory of BOT concession contracts." Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 89 (2013): 187-209. 
48
Henrik M. Inadomi. Independent power projects in developing countries: legal investment protection and 
consequences for development. Vol. 7.Kluwer Law International, 2010. 
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government via its 1999 Electricity Act allows for liberalization of the sector and also 
provides a regulatory framework for players in the sector.
49
 
IPP is also used in development of renewable energy via the vehicle of BOT.
50
 This is due to 
the governmental need to retain control over the power sector, facilitate transfer of 
technology, provide funds for the needed change to use of renewable energy and partly bear 
the risks inherent in the relatively new area. This type of BOT involves the sponsors and the 
project company on one side, the host government and the power purchaser on the other side. 
The sponsors can comprise of the multinational energy companies, construction companies 
(due to construction work involved in power project) and national company (a company from 
the host country). The project company is the company formed for the sole purpose of 
undertaking and completing the project. It is the concessionaire of the BOT project. Its right 
and obligation are defined in the concession or project agreement with the government.
51
 Its 
responsibilities are to finance, design, build and operate the generation facility in order to 
receive a stable income once it is completed. To this end, it will enter into a number of 
contracts and agreement with other private sector participants. Such contracts/agreements 
include: agreement on equity financing from sponsors; debt financing from international 
banks or the financial markets; engineering procurement and construction contract; and 
operation and maintenance agreement.   
The power purchaser as the names goes indicate the one who buys out the power generated by 
the project company during its operation period. The contract between the project company 
and the power purchaser is called the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). The PPA is 
important in the BOT project in power sector because it ensures certainty that there will be 
demand for the power produced by the Project Company which in turns ensures returns on 
investment. The revenue generated is used to offset the operating cost, maintenance, 
repayment of debt principal, financing schemes and also provides a return for the shareholders 
(sponsors) of the special purpose. The power purchaser could be the government/ public 
utilities or private investors. The use of the power purchaser is adaptable to BOTs in the 
renewable energy sector because it is a new area and the revenue is uncertain. In addition, 
renewable energy competes with cheap energy from fossil fuel. Without a single buyer, the 
                                                             
49
The Electricity Act, 1999, Part VI, Section 51 found at 
http://www.opm.go.ug/assets/media/resources/145/ELECTRICITY%20ACT%201999.pdfS 
50 E.g.StungRusseyChrumKrom Hydropower Plant , this a bot project in Cambodia 
http://ppi.worldbank.org/explore/Report.aspx 
51Guidelines for infrastructure development through Build Operate Transfer(BOT ) Projects, 1996 
15 
 
investment might be jeopardized. This is applicable to investors in renewable energy that are 
connected to the grid. This sector has been made attractive for private investors through tax 
incentives or tax breaks, feed- in tariffs, subsidies, favourable energy policies, guarantees and 
good contract terms.
52
 The support given by the government is incorporated into the 
implementation agreement.
53
Off grid renewable investors have direct access to the 
consumers.  Incentives received in this area are more of tax reduction, financial and 
production subventions. 
However, risks are inevitable in business and construction work. This also applies to BOT. 
According to C Walker and A J Smith, these risks can be divided broadly into financial risk, 
political risk and technical risk. The risks can also be grouped based on the different stages of 
the project; Pre investment, Implementation, Construction, Operations and Transfer stage.
54
 
 
2.3. Risks in BOT 
2.3.1. Political and Regulatory Risk 
Political risk can be defined as action of government that serves as a threat to the profitability 
of a particular project.
55
 It involves the political regime or atmosphere of the host country 
which is subject to change at any time.  The new government may not favour the project or 
may have different expectations. Furthermore, it can unilaterally change the terms of 
investments (Obsolescing bargain)
56
, due to public pressure. There might be outbreak of war 
or strife at the location of this investment, expropriation, currency transfer restriction based on 
political motives, unstable political and legal regime, lack of support from government, 
political violence and so on.  
Expropriation involves taking over the property or investment of a foreign investor. It 
constitutes political risks when such taking over is not for public purpose, discriminatory and 
without adequate compensation. 
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Regulatory risk is an integral part of political risk. Both are closely associated because 
changes in laws, rules and regulations are made based on the social, economic, political and 
environmental pressure. At the time of investment, the existing laws might be favourable to 
the terms of the contract. Tax incentives might be given
57
 and prices subsidized. However due 
to the long time duration of some of these projects, changes might occur in the legislation 
which might affect the core of the investment. This also applies more in renewable energy 
because of the large capital involvement. A study done in North Africa on risks to solar power 
energy emphasized this more.
58
 The study shows that regulatory risk is the biggest concern of 
investors in this sector of renewable energy.
59
 For example, Sri Lanka made a new regulatory 
framework for IPP in third Party Mini- hydro developers in 1997. These provisions provided 
for standardized non-negotiable power purchase tariffs and contracts. Investments were based 
on this provision. However, within the space of 2yrs, there was decline in the purchase tariffs. 
It dropped from 5cents /KWH to 3.5 cents. This development stalled the market and 
discouraged long term investment in Mini- hydro developers.
60
 Another example of investor‟s 
dependence on regulatory framework is seen in Tamil Nadu Electricity Utility Saga in India. 
Indian‟s framework for IPP included long term tariffs, transmission wheeling and power 
banking. In 2001, Tamil Nadu Electric Utility refused power wheeling and banking for new 
wind power generation. In addition, “it did not provide automatic annual increases in rates to 
adjust inflation”61. This also led to less investment in this wind power.62 
 
2.3.2. Financial risk 
The concessionaire provides the fund for the takeoff of BOT project. The funds can be 
through its own funds or through loans from large financial institution, banks or bond-
holders.
63
 The fund could also be through the project sponsors who worked through a vehicle 
called the project company. Through this company, they are able to minimize their financial 
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risk. Their liabilities will be based on the amount of capital plunged into the project. Financial 
risk is evident in all the phases of BOT. 
Yiannis Xenidis and Demos Angelides identified 27 causes of  financial risks based on their 
phases covered in the project.
64
 It also went ahead to categorize these risks based on their 
origin for example: the concessionaire, and the market. Financial risks emanating from the 
state involves prolonged negotiation period prior to project initiation, unfavorable economy in 
the host country, import/export restrictions and rate of return restrictions. Financial risks from 
concessionaire involves lack of creditworthiness, inability of debt service, bankruptcy, 
unfavorable economy of the country of the main stakeholder, high bidding costs , errors in 
forecasting the demand, high construction costs and high design cost. Market-related financial 
risks includes: fall in demand, fluctuations in inflation rate, loan risk, taxation risk, 
competition risk and currency risk. 
 
2.3.3. Technical risks 
Technical risks are risk based on the technicalities of the investment itself. Amongst other 
things it involves the construction difficulties like equipment breakdown, completion delays 
due to change in project structure/design and operation risks.
65
 Some of these technical risks 
are fall out from other risks. For example, completion delay can be due to undue interference 
from the government, delay in funding, lack of peace and stability at the investment 
location.These risks are inherent in all types of BOT projects be it in renewable energy sector, 
transport sector or water provision sector. Investors analyze these risks based on what is 
obtainable in each country.  
These risks are higher in renewable energy sector than in other sectors. This is because the use 
of renewable energy is still at its infancy stage in a world where much reliance has been 
placed on the use of fossil- fuel. It is a relatively new area in most of the developing countries. 
Their regulatory policies in renewable energy are still at the infancy stage.  Renewable energy 
has high transaction cost and huge capital requirement. It needs governmental support to 
ensure its viability. There may be need for price subsidy from the government because the 
public might not be willing to purchase power from renewable energy due to its high cost.  
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Various measures have been taken to help in mitigating risks associated with BOT. The 
formation of Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is a direct response to 
political risk and financial risk. National insurance scheme for company that is registered in 
the country where such national insurance scheme exists is also another measure.
66
 In 
addition, risk assessment and models for such have been provided by literatures.  Government 
guarantees and stabilization clauses in contract and bilateral agreements are also part of the 
measures to mitigate the risks involved in BOT. The government guarantees may be found in 
a detailed concession; where the host state gives assurances and undertakings to allay the 
fears of the investors. Such guarantees may include: unimpeded transfer of money in both 
foreign and local currency in and out of the host state country; protection against future 
changes and development in laws; protection against regulation of tax regime which might 
adversely affect the cost structure and profitability of the project.
67
 
This thesis will not access the market structure which is outside the IIL. 
 
3. PROTECTION OFFERED BY INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
Most of the protections offered by IIL are found in international agreement. The primary 
purpose of international agreement (either bilateral or multilateral) is to offer legal and 
financial protection to investments in developing country.
68
 Nonetheless, it has recently been 
used to attract investment.
69
A country is presumed to be safe to an extent when it is a party to 
an investment treaty.  The purpose of these treaties is to facilitate the flow of investment 
between the countries that are parties to it. The presence of investment treaty could be an 
added advantage to attract investors in renewable energy. This chapter will analyse these 
protections and how it can protect BOT investors in renewable energy. 
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3.1. International Investment Agreements 
The sources of international investment law include: the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Dispute between States and nationals of the other states (The ICSID Convention 
and the international agreements\treaties (may be bilateral or multilateral). An example of 
multilateral international agreement is the energy charter treaty.
70
 Other sources of 
international investment law are: customary international law; the general principles of law 
and unilateral statements; and case laws.
71
 Each of these sources offers protection directly or 
indirectly to foreign investments.  They serve as the legal basis in settlement of dispute 
between states and investors. 
The protection of foreign investments can be traced to the customary international law which 
obligated host state to treat foreign investment according to international minimum standard.
72
 
In the 70s, state sovereignty on rights to nationalize and expropriate investments was 
recognized but the issue of compensation was not obligatory.
73
 Where payment is necessary, 
it must be according to the national laws and not international laws.
74
 The threat of 
uncompensated expropriation led to the emergence of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT). 
The treaties were made by the developed countries with developing countries. The principle 
of prompt, effective and adequate compensation was one of the main principles entrenched in 
the agreements.
75
 In addition, the Most Favoured Nation and National treatment with fair and 
equitable treatment for covered investments were guaranteed. In 1965, the international 
convention for settlement of dispute (ICSID) was established. This provided a legal system 
for the arbitration of breach of treaty terms by the host states, thereby providing for means of 
settlement of dispute outside espousal.   Another good feature of ICSID is that it allows the 
private investor to initiate arbitration directly against the host state.
76
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The 1990s witnessed the conclusion of several treaties which focus not only on protection of 
investment, but also on liberalization of investment flows.
77
 In addition, countries engage 
more in signing of treaties because they believe the existence of treaties will attract more 
foreign investors and increase their foreign direct investment flows. On the other hand, the 
foreign investors believe the existence of the treaties will provide international legal 
protection and give security against political risks.
78
 
Initially, BITS were signed between developed and developing countries.
79
Later, treaties were 
signed between developing countries. However, treaties were rarely signed between 
developed countries as their legal systems have been developed over time with experience in 
such areas.
80
 Apart from BITs, IIAs also involve regional and multilateral agreements on 
investments. Examples of regional agreements are: North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA); Agreements signed by European Union and Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations to promote and protect free flow of investments between the membership countries.  
Energy Charter Treaty is another investment treaty with open membership to all interested 
states. Energy Charter treaty exclusively contains provisions on energy investment. It 
provides multilateral framework for energy cooperation in energy investment under the 
international law. It helps to promote policies that remove barriers to flow of energy 
investment needed for energy security.
81
 The protections offered can be invoked by investors 
in renewable energy. 
BITs allow the countries the opportunity to choose the country they want to partner with. 
Moreover, it allows for flexibility and development of the agreement according to their 
specifications. Rapid completion of agreement is another advantage of BITs. Most of the BITs 
deal with post-establishment stage of the investments and leave the pre-establishment to be 
decided autonomously by the host states.
82
 Most provisions on establishment provide that 
investment must be established according to the legal requirements of the host state. 
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3.2. The Protections 
The features of a typical BIT/Multilateral agreements include: the preamble, the scope of 
application, admission and establishment of investment, investment promotion, general 
standards of treatment, expropriation, war and civil disturbance, transfer of funds, umbrella 
clause, other specific clauses, transparency, treaty exceptions and emerging issues and dispute 
resolution. This work will deal more on the terms that have to deal with mid and post 
establishment issues. It is reasoned that what happens at the operational stage of BOT mostly 
determines the profitability of the project. Hence, it is assumed that the selection and the 
construction stages were successful.  
These features and their uses will be explained. The principles in the explained terms are 
general and they are applicable in all sectors and contracts. I considered the General standards 
of treatment and the transfer of funds. 
 
3.3. General Standards of treatment 
The general standards of treatment include: fair and equitable treatments (FET); most favored 
nation treatment (MFN); National Treatment; full protection and security; and expropriation. 
These standards can be found in BIT and multilateral treaties. Breach of any of these terms by 
the host state could be redressed in the dispute settlement process prescribed in the treaty.  
 
3.3.1. Fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
The meaning of what is fair and equitable treatment is a broad one.
83
 Through decided cases, 
this treatment has been held to include: stability and the protection of the investor‟s legitimate 
expectations;
84
 transparency on the part of the government;
85
 compliance with contractual 
obligations; procedural propriety and due process;
86
 good faith; and freedom from coercion 
and harassment.
87
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The standard of FET is an absolute minimum standard independent of how nationals of a third 
state or nationals of the host state are treated.
88
 This principle in some treaties is equated with 
the customary international law of minimum standard of treatment.
89
  Some scholars have 
argued that the customary international law minimum standard is a floor not a ceiling for 
threshold of FET.
90
 The judgment of what is fair and equitable is done on case by case basis 
through the application of governing treaties to the facts available.
91
 When it is equated with 
the international minimum standard;
92
 it is to be interpreted as such. However, there is no 
uniform interpretation as to if FET is equivalent to minimum standard of treatment in 
international law, when it is not expressly stated in the treaty.  
Recently, tribunals have concentrated more on the contents of FET than its relationship to the 
international minimum standard of treatment.
93
 Any treatment from the host state which falls 
under this category can be a good reason to initiate arbitration against the host state. This 
standard can be used where there is no stabilization clause guaranteed by the host country. 
This is because one of its components is the stability and protection of legitimate expectation 
of the investor. For example, change in the legal frame work made to attract investment in 
renewable energy, is subject to arbitration. Especially if such change adversely affects the 
profitability of the project. A good illustration of this is the current arbitral case against Spain 
at the UNCITRAL.
94
 However, arbitrators are more disposed to deciding the arbitration in 
favour of the investor when it is more explicit. More about legitimate expectation is discussed 
under section 3.5.1. 
Not all treatments that are perceived to be bad constitute violation against this principle. In 
examining the conducts of the state, the tribunal is looking for acts that are arbitrary and 
irrational and not for error in policy or judgment. In Saluka v. The Czech Republic‟s case,95 
the Tribunal stated:  
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“The Treaty cannot be interpreted so as to penalise each and every breach by the 
Government of the rules or regulations to which it is subject and for which the investor may 
normally seek redress before the courts of the host State. […] something more than simple 
illegality or lack of authority under the domestic law of a State is necessary to render an act 
or measure inconsistent with the customary international law requirements”96. 
 The investor seeking to invoke this standard must consider the wording of the clause. Despite 
the question that trails this standard and the fact that it still evolving in its use/interpretation; it 
is one of the main standards of protection in a BIT. The broad definition of this provision 
gives wide latitude of acts of host state that can be arbitrated. For a BOT investor, this 
provision is important. It constitutes a measure to mitigate political risk. It also serves as the 
backup mechanism to redress breach of contractual obligation, lack of due process and 
transparency, refusal to grant necessary consent or license. 
 
3.3.2. Most Favored Nation Treatment (MFN) 
This treatment required that a state should treat the investors of a state the way it will treat 
another investor from other states.  It tends to prevent discrimination on basis of nationality. 
This principle can be invoked provided it is part of the treaty terms. It applies to matter within 
the scope of the treaty in relation to investment / investor. It is a relative standard which is 
applied to similar objective situations. It requires the finding of a less favorable treatment and 
is governed by the Ejusdem Generis principle.
97
 The discrimination can be de jure
98
 or de 
facto.
99
 Some treaties are more explicit on the application of MFN treatment.
100
 This principle 
can apply to both substantive and procedural matters. On the substantive matters, there has 
been little or no controversy in its application, provided the burden of prove is discharged as 
required. Standards of protection have been read into BITs via MFN.
101
 The application of 
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MFN principle to cover events that have occurred before the basic treaty came into place was 
rejected by the tribunal.
102
  This situation is seen in Société Générale v. Dominican 
Republic.
103
 In the case, the tribunal rejected the attempt made by the claimant to qualify 
investments not covered by the basic treaty through the invocation of a third party treaty. It 
held that: 
“Each treaty defines what it considers a protected investment and who is entitled to that 
protection, and definitions can change from treaty to treaty. In this situation, resort to the 
specific text of the MFN clause is unnecessary because it applies only to the treatment 
accorded to such defined investment, but not to the definition of „investment‟ itself” 
In essence, the basic treaty must be applied first through its definitions and clauses before 
invoking the third party treaty.
104
 In finding a violation of MFN principle, the essential 
condition is the existence of a different treatment accorded to another foreign investor in a 
similar situation. 
On the contrary, a lot of controversy has beguiled the application of MFN principle to dispute 
settlements especially in procedural matters.  One opinion is based on literal interpretation 
which allows the application of MFN to procedural matters while the other opinion is against 
it.  In Emilio Agustín Maffezini V. The Kingdom of Spain
105
, the court held that MFN 
principle can be applied in order to benefit from favorable procedural conditions in a third 
party treaty. The tribunal qualified this benefit by laying out instances where MFN might not 
be applicable. An example is in the areas that might affect the public policy essential to the 
formation of the basic treaty.  Nevertheless, some other tribunals have decided otherwise with 
regards to jurisdiction on the basis that the state‟s consent to arbitration should be explicit and 
not inferred.
106
 The need to prevent treaty shopping has also been one of the reasons 
canvassed against the use of MFN to broaden jurisdiction. The use of MFN will provide an 
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opportunity for a BOT investor to make use of favourable provisions available in other BITs 
in the host country. However, this must not be against the basic purpose of the main treaty.
107
 
 
3.3.3. National Treatment 
The national treatment rule provides that the host state should accord to foreign investors and 
their investment treatment no less favourable to that which it accords to its own domestic 
investors.
108
 This provision creates a level playing ground for the foreign investors and its 
local competitors. The scope of application of this provision depends on the sectors it covers 
in the treaty. Some BITs extends its application to admission and establishment, while some 
do not.
109
 The bases of comparison are considered in finding a breach of this provision.  Such 
bases includes: existence of differentiation, non-justification for differentiation and the 
relevance of discriminatory intent.
110
 This provision is relevant for investors in BOT in 
renewable energy.  
New technology invention in renewable energy investment necessitates a level playing ground 
for all potential actors. States might be tempted to enact measures which might favour their 
domestic investors over the foreign ones. The implementation agreement contains rules 
against such measures.
111
 In some agreements, it is only applicable to tax.
112
 Other measures 
that affect only the foreign investor can be arbitrated under this provision. However, in 
treating the question of non-justification, it is widely accepted that differentiation are 
justifiable if rational grounds are shown. 
 
3.3.4. Full Protection and Security 
This is another standard of protection that requires the host state to provide protection against 
physical violence and harassment and also provides legal protection.
113
 The standard in some 
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treaties appear as a single standard with fair and equitable treatment.
114
 However, it is a 
separate standard in others. The standard does not require the state to provide absolute 
protection from legal and physical infringement. It merely requires state to exercise due 
diligence and to take measures that will protect the foreign investment as is reasonable under 
a given circumstances.
115
 The duty to grant this protection may operate in relation to state 
organs, agency actions or private acts.   In AAPL v. Sri Lanka,
116
 the tribunal held that the 
state has failed to carry out the necessary actions expected when there was an insurgent 
activity in the area where the company farm was situated.  This view was upheld in Biwater 
Gautiff v. Tanzania, where it was held that the full protection does not only extend to states 
prevention of actions by third parties, but also to actions by state organs
117
. In Azurix v. 
Argentina,
118
 
 “it was held that full protection is not only a matter of physical security; the stability afforded 
by a secure environment is as important from an investor‟s point of view”119 
However, in these cases, the use of “full” protection was evident in the treaties. It remains to 
be seen if ordinary use of words “protection and security” will be interpreted as such. This 
protection is important for BOTs in renewable energy in developing countries. Some of these 
countries are insecure due to activities of insurgents. Actions or inactions of host state related 
to protection can be brought under this provision. However, it should be noted that due 
diligence and necessary measures reasonable in the circumstances are required from the state. 
 
3.3.5. Transfer of funds 
The condition for transfer of fund from and into the host state is of importance to the foreign 
investor.  He needs to import funds into the state for the investment and also repatriate funds 
back to its home country. This concern is against the monetary policy of the host state whose 
concern is also to monitor and control the flow of currency in and out of the state as sudden 
inflow or outflow of funds could affect the economy of the host state. This area is mostly 
regulated in the BITs taking into considerations the concern of both sides. There are three 
issues arising from the use of this standard. First issue is whether the transfer should apply to 
                                                             
114 For example, Bahrain-United States BIT (1999),Article (2) (3)a, Rwanda-United States BIT (2008) Article 5 
115
 AAPL v Sri Lanka, Award, , 27 June 1990, para 53 
116
Ibid, para 85 
117BiwaterGautiff v. Tanzania, Award 24 July, 2008,para 703 
118
Azurix  v. Argentina, Award, 14 July, 2006 
119Ibid, para 408 
27 
 
both inflow and outflow of fund? Second issue is whether the provisions in the treaty apply to 
all funds related to the investments or those specified in the treaty? Third issue is whether the 
transfer of funds should be regulated by the domestic laws and regulations?
120
 Some treaty 
grants provision on the outflow of funds,
121
 while some focus on both inflow and outflow 
with exceptions.
122
 Some specify if the transfer of funds should be subject to the domestic 
laws of the parties or to international principles.  There is no dominant pattern in this area. In 
considering the breach of this term, the tribunal in Continental Casualty v. Argentina,
123
 
considered if the transfer denied constituted an area covered by the investment protection 
under the treaty. There may be need for a host state to place restrictions on right to transfer 
during financial disorder. But these exceptions should have been specified in the treaty. This 
shows that the way the term is framed and its restrictions are important in interpretation of 
this term. The freedom to be able to transfer profits made is important to a BOT investor. 
Investors should note that it is their responsibility to follow all the procedure necessary to 
obtain authorization for transfer of funds. With this background, BOT investors can resort to 
dispute settlement when the condition guaranteed by the host state has been breached. The 
transfer in dispute should constitute the type of transfer covered by the treaty. More 
favourable terms for transfer of fund may be available in the implementation agreement. This 
can be arbitrated under the umbrella clause protection. 
 
3.4. The Umbrella Clause 
This clause guarantees the observance of obligations of the host state, in respect to the foreign 
investor. This includes the observance of contractual obligations and other commitments. The 
main issue of concern in applying this term is: if ordinary breach of contract term can amount 
to a breach of this clause? Tribunals in answering this question have come out with three 
different approaches. The first one, which connotes a restrictive application, indicates that an 
ordinary breach of contract terms will not amount to a breach of the treaty.
124
  The second 
approach is a broad interpretation which connotes otherwise.
125
 The third approach use the 
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restrictive method but applied a distinction between acts of the state as sovereignty and acts of 
the state for commercial purposes.
126
   In addition, Prof August Reinisch argued that breach of 
contact term can constitute breach of treaty.
127
 He reasoned that both claims can be treated 
separately as breach of treaty under the international tribunal; and breach of contractual terms 
under the domestic law.
128
 However, the way the clause is framed in the treaty and its overall 
position in relation to the structure of the treaty determines the interpretation.
129
 Treaties 
which adopts the use of the word observance of “any” obligation, with regards to investment, 
tends towards the broad interpretation than with other ones.
130
 The second and the third 
approach provide a more favorable position for investors seeking protection in this area. In the 
developing country, the judiciary system is not entirely independent of the executive. This 
makes it difficult to get a fair judgment when there is dispute centered on breach of contract. 
The last two approaches provides a good ground for arbitration based on breach of treaty 
provision for a BOT investor who  does not have confidence in the judiciary system of the 
host state.  BOT investors should negotiate contractual terms in favour of international 
arbitration while the state is acting for commercial purposes. Breach of the obligations of 
government outlined in the implementation agreement can be arbitrated via this provision. 
There are instances where contracts were made by persons other than the state and the 
investor. An example is a contract between a subdivision of the state and the subsidiary of the 
investor.  This is usually applicable in the case of the power purchaser. The power purchaser 
is a legal entity different from the government. The principle of attribution can be applied in 
such cases.  
 
3.4.1. The Principle of Attribution 
  The principle of attribution is a customary law principle. It depicts that a state is responsible 
for all its organs and at all levels.
131
 This principle is set out in Article four of the International 
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Law Commission‟s (ILC) article on state‟s responsibility.132 It does not matter if such action 
was committed by the executive, judiciary or legislative arm of the government, neither does 
it matter if such acts were made ultra vires.
133
 Generally, investors do not have direct contact 
with host state but its entities. The acts of these entities can be attributed to the state provided 
they are empowered by the state to exercise elements of governmental authority, and are 
acting in that capacity at that particular instance. Another scenario is if such entity is acting on 
the instructions of, or under the direct control of that state, in carrying out the function.
134
 It 
must be noted that conduct with regards to state entities merely concern governmental activity 
and not other private or commercial activity.
135
 In respect to state organ there is no such 
distinction. 
The above test known as the structure, function and control test has been applied by different 
tribunals in attributing responsibility to state.
136
 The tribunal in Salini v. Morroco used these 
tests to arrive at the conclusion that a Moroccan Company (ADM) which has the 
responsibility of constructing, maintaining and operation of high ways and major 
communication routes is a state entity. This is because it was de facto controlled by the state 
and it carried out functions which were state matters. The delegation of duty to state entities 
does not relieve a state from its responsibility for breach of treaty.
137
 
Another example of this is found in Nycomb v. Latvia.
138
 In this case, the government gave a 
double price tariff for 8years as incentive for investment in the power sector. Electricity 
generated by these investors is brought by a state entity named Latvernago. Contracts were 
signed based on the double tarrif. The law was repealed after the investors have constructed 
their plants.  Consequently, Latvernago refused to buy the electricity at the contractual price. 
Wandu, one of the foreign investors, initiated arbitration at the international level. It was held 
that Latvernego is a state entity because it was fully owned and control by the state - “clearly 
an instrument of the State in a highly regulated electricity market.”139 The power purchasers 
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in developing countries are principally state entities. This provision enables a BOT investor in 
renewable energy the opportunity to hold the host state responsible for actions of the 
ministries. The power purchasers and other governmental corporations can also be held 
responsible. However, it should be noted such act will only be attributed to the state when the 
entities are acting under the instruction of the state. 
 
3.5. Expropriation 
 Protection against expropriation is another important provision in the BITs. The state has the 
right to expropriate. This is in line with the notion of sovereignty. However, for expropriation 
to be legal it must be for public purpose. It must not be arbitrary or discriminating and it must 
be accompanied with prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Most bilateral treaties 
acknowledge the right to expropriate with these reservations.
140
 In recent years, some BITS 
mentioned both direct and indirect expropriation.
141
 Direct expropriation happens when the 
state takes over a foreign private investment. In indirect expropriation; the government makes 
it impossible to run the investment while ownership still resides with the investor. 
Expropriation can be interpreted to cover both direct and indirect expropriation where indirect 
expropriation is not expressly mentioned.
142
 
States rarely engage in direct expropriation
143
except in the times of emergency. This is 
because it does not portray such countries as being investment-friendly. However, there has 
been herald of cases before the tribunal on indirect expropriation. In indirect expropriation, 
the acts in question must have been attributed to the state.
144
 There should be interference 
with property rights or other protected legal interests of such degree that the relevant rights or 
interests lose all or most of their value or the owner is deprived of control over the 
investment, even though the owner retains the legal title or remains in physical possession.”145 
For expropriation to occur, the measure or measures considered must have had a destructive 
and long lasting effect on the economic value of the investment and its benefits.
146
 In addition, 
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the measures must have led to total or near-total destruction of the economic value of the 
investment. However, the mere fact that the measure has an adverse effect is not sufficient for 
the finding of an expropriation.
147
 The character of the governmental measure and the extent 
with which it affected the reasonable investment backed expectation is also examined.
148
 
Another factor examined is the existence of expectation on the part of the investor that a 
certain measure will not be taken by the host state.  This kind of expectation is called 
legitimate expectation. It is however important to note that host states change their policies 
from time to time to meet up with the changes in their economies and global world in general. 
It will therefore be unreasonable for an investor to think that a particular law or rule will not 
change especially if it is a long time investment.
149
 The power of the state to make rules and 
regulation is called the police power. The relationship between police power and legitimate 
expectations is discussed below.  
 
3.5.1. Police Powers versus Legitimate Expectations 
The state has the power to make rules and regulations for itself.
150
 Acts of states made in 
exercise of this power are contained in international law and are not subject to compensation 
in principle.
151
 The Restatement (third) of foreign relations of the United States, section 712, 
comment (g) captured this doctrine as follows; 
“ a state is not responsible for the loss of property or other economic disadvantages resulting 
from bonafide taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind that is 
commonly accepted as within the police power of state, if it is not discriminatory, and is not 
designed  to cause the alien to abandon the  property to the state or sell at a distress price” 
The principle is incorporated in some treaties as annexes or part of the main clause.
152
 It is 
also recognized by tribunals. For example in Methanex v. USA, the tribunal held that a non 
discriminating regulation for public purpose, enacted according to the due process and 
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affecting a foreign investor‟s investment, is not due expropriatory  excepts if the government 
has given a representation that such law will not be enacted.
153
 This was also recognized in 
Feldman v. Mexico where the tribunal acknowledged that governments should be free to 
make law in public interest.
154
 
Tribunals have had the task to distinguish between non-compensable regulations and indirect 
expropriation.  They have in their wisdom and through different cases, determined that these 
power is regulated by some conditions which if not fulfilled can make such measures become 
expropriatory and compensable. The first condition is if the host state has given a 
representation that such law will not be enacted or a particular law will not be changed.  
Legitimate expectation consists of a representation from the host state that a particular law or 
regulation will not be enacted or will not be changed. Legitimate expectation is defined in 
Thunderbird v. Mexico
155
 as follows; 
“the concept of “legitimate expectations” relates, within the context of the NAFTA 
framework, to a situation where a Contracting Party‟s conduct creates reasonable and 
justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said 
conduct, such that a failure by the NAFTA Party to honor those expectations could cause the 
investor (or investment) to suffer damages” 
The legal frame work of the host state at the time of investment provides the basis for the 
legitimate expectations. Changes that remain within the normal boundaries of normal 
adjustments customary in the host state and accepted in other states will not constitute a 
violation of legitimate expectation.
156
 In analyzing “legitimate expectations”, the basis for 
such expectations is very important.
157
 If such expectation was created by an assurance given 
by the host state, change in such rule might lead to expropriation.
158
 Such representation can 
be implicit or explicit.
159
 The provisions of the stabilization clause in contract\concession or 
government guarantees are good example of an explicit representation for legitimate 
expectation. The reliance on such representation by an investor especially - while it is an 
inducement for the making of such investment (and when it affects the investment of such 
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investor); made the enacted of such regulation tantamount to expropriation. In Revere Copper 
& Brass, Inc. v. OPIC,
160
the tribunal held that; 
“ We regard these principles as particularly applicable where the question is, as here, 
whether actions taken by a government contrary to and damaging to the economic interests of 
aliens are in conflict with undertakings and assurances given in good faith to such aliens as 
an inducement to their making the investments affected by the action.”161 
It is to be noted that specific or explicit commitment are more preferable than implicit ones as 
the latter will not provide a sufficient basis for legitimate expectation especially when they are 
unofficial.
162
 In Mobil and Murphy v. Canada,
163
 the tribunal held that the burden is on the 
claimant to: establish a clear and specific representation given by the host state; its reliance on 
such representation; and its subsequent repudiation by the host state.
164
  After considering the 
facts, the tribunal held that there was no specific assurance given by the host state.  
In response to this principle, scholars have argued that investment law must strike a balance 
between “stability, security, predictability and fairness for the foreign investor with state 
regulation in the public interest.”165  As much as investors prefer stability, such stability does 
not connote a regulatory stand still. States, especially developing states, should not be allowed 
to pay compensation in such instances especially where it is regulation in the public interest. 
As Dolzer noted: 
“reliance upon structures that reinforce underdevelopment does not deserve protection under 
modern international law; for arrangements falling into this category, the risks involved 
should probably be allocated to the investor.”166 
The long duration of BOT contracts makes it vulnerable to change in regulatory framework. 
There is need for stabilization clause and government guarantees to ensure the stability of 
such regulation. The investor should not be left to bear such risks alone if the measure taken 
by the government totally destroys the viability of such investment.  
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 Secondly, the nature, purpose and character of such measure or regulation are necessary in 
ascertaining the difference. Some BITs explicitly introduced these criteria in their treaties.
167
  
Non-compensable exercise of police powers should be consistent with international minimum 
standards. Police powers exercise in violation of the minimum standard cannot be justified as 
this will be in violation of international customary law. When a regulation is made in a 
discriminatory manner, lacked due process and not for public purpose, such regulation is 
deemed expropriatory.
168
  Moreover, when such regulations constitute an abuse of rights, 
abusive takings or are of economic benefit to the state
169
, they are tantamount to expropriation 
which is compensable.  In Link- trading joint stock Company v. Moldova, where the issue of 
consideration is a fiscal measure within the police power of the state, the tribunal noted as 
follows: 
“As a general matter, fiscal measures only become expropriatory when they are found to be 
an abusive taking. Abuse arises where it is demonstrated that the State has acted unfairly or 
inequitably towards the investment, where it has adopted measures that are arbitrary or 
discriminatory in character or in their manner of implementation, or where the measures 
taken violate an obligation undertaken by the State in regard to the investment.”170 
The third instance is when there is lack of proportionality between the measure taken and the 
need in question. The issue of proportionality was first invoked in Tecmed v. Mexico
171
 and 
has been followed in other cases. Where state actions are disproportionate to the need being 
addressed, then there could be incurring of liability on the part of the state. This principle is 
equally used in the European human rights courts in determining the dispossession of 
property.  In Azurix v. Argentina, the tribunal held that that proportionality will be lacking if 
the persons concerned bears an individual and excessive burden.
172
 However, it should be 
noted that international law gives states a wide margin of discretion with respect to questions 
on priority of public purpose and suitability of the measure.
173
 The legal frame work for 
Renewable energy investment might be subject to changes as technology, capacity and 
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technical know-how improves. However, such changes should not affect the economic 
viability of BOT investors substantially. 
Tribunals have also considered if breach in contractual agreement is a measure tantamount to 
expropriation. In Azurix Corp. v. the Argentine Republic
174
 it was held that; 
 “Whether contract rights may be expropriated is widely accepted by the case law and the 
doctrine…….contractual breaches by State party or one of its instrumentalities would not 
normally constitute expropriation. Whether one or series of such breaches can be considered 
to be measures tantamount to expropriation will depend on whether the State or its 
instrumentality has breached the contract in the exercise of its sovereign authority, or as a 
party to a contract. As already noted, a State or its instrumentalities may perform a contract 
badly, but this will not result in a breach of treaty provisions “unless it be proved that the 
state or its emanation has gone beyond its role as a mere party to the contract, and has 
exercised the specific functions of a sovereign.”175 
 From above, it can be deduced that contractual rights can be expropriated.  This occurs when 
the state is acting in his capacity as a sovereign through decree, exercise of legislative actor or 
executive power. In addition, such measures should have effects equivalent to expropriation. 
This principle is related to the notion deduced in umbrella clause while deciding when a 
breach in contract amounts to breach in treaty.  
From the above, lots of factors are considered when an investment is deemed expropriated. 
For a BOT investor in renewable energy, it might be difficult to prove expropriation when the 
measures complained of came up when the investment is to be handed over.  This is because 
one of the factors for expropriation is for the effect of the measure to have been substantial 
and last for a significant period of time. In addition, tribunals might be reluctant to find 
expropriation when the investor still has substantial control over the investment. However, 
such measures can still be brought under the fair and equitable provision. 
In line with the principle of reparation, tribunals awards compensation to the investor when 
the host state is found guilty of indirect expropriation.
176
 The fair market value is considered 
while deciding the value of the investment. The value of the investment at the time of the 
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award is considered. This can have both positive and negative effect for the BOT investor. 
The viability of the investment could have appreciated or depreciated.  
Another provision for protection for foreign investors, as earlier mentioned, is the opportunity 
to settle dispute via a neutral body other than the courts of the host state. This will be 
discussed in detail in chapter four. 
 
3.6. Exemption Clauses (Non-precluded measures) 
The IIL through its BITs also provides exemption from the application of its protection. The 
exemption are based on issues including: international agreements relating to taxation, 
customs, European union law for member states of the European Union, emergency situations 
such as war and social unrest, necessity, armed conflicts, force majeure, environmental 
matters and public health. A good example of this is in US Model BIT (2012) Article 12. This 
article guarantees the right of host state to make regulations in relation to environmental law. 
This entails protection of environment and prevention of danger to human, animal, plant life 
or health.  Moreover, measures taken for reasons of public security, order and morality are not 
considered to be a breach of the provisions of such treaties. Another good example is the BIT 
Model of Canada, Article 9 and 10.
177
 The non-precluded measure provision for 
environmental reasons also includes the measures made for curtailing the greenhouse 
emissions. It allows the host state to make new rules as necessary while it also prevents it 
from changing the existing rules arbitrarily. Some countries also include energy sector as part 
of their exception clauses. This might not be to the advantage of the BOT investor in 
renewable energy. The investor will not be able to rely on the protections explained above. 
However, the investors can still rely on these provisions if the host state is party to ECT. 
All the provisions explained above are meant for the protection of the investments of the 
investor in the host country.  Investors in BOT contract can rely on these protections in 
addition to the protection offered by the concession contract entered into at the onset of 
establishing such investment. Contractual breach can be brought under the auspices of the 
international forum via the umbrella clause or if the forum selection for settlement of dispute 
provides for such.  Actions of government that were unfair and discriminating and not in good 
faith can be brought under the fair and equitable treatment.  
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However, there are instances where there is a state of emergency in the host state which might 
demand the immediate change in the policy of the state or make the state to take actions 
which might negatively affect investment. State of emergency could be as a result of war, 
force majeure instances, civil unrest, natural or manmade disasters. Provisions are being made 
for such instances in the text of the treaty. How did tribunals treat emergency cases where the 
state of emergency in the treaty has been pleaded or where there is no provision for such 
emergency in the treaty? Who should bear the risk in such instances, the host state or the 
investor? 
In recent times, the situation in Argentina provides a good example of such instance. The 
country had recently changed its law due to its economic crises. This change had negative 
effect on foreign investment. In the next section, I will discuss the case of Argentina and try to 
provide insight into what a BOT investor in renewable energy might expect in such instances. 
 
3.6.1. Case Discussion (Argentina Cases) and application to BOT 
Argentina faced some institutional crisis in the 1980s. In a bid to solve this crisis, the 
government enacted a legislation called convertibility law where she pegged its local currency 
to dollar. Furthermore, it carried out a series of privatization of the public sector via 
concession and licenses. Publicity which involves promises of legal guarantees, stable and 
secure environment was made to attract investors especially those interested in long term 
investment. However, in the next decade, the country was affected deeply by the world 
economic crises. In 2002, the country introduced a public emergence law in order to save its 
economy. This law terminated convertibility law and also issued some decrees and rules 
which affected the public utility sector.  Investors whose investment was affected negatively 
by the new policy instituted case at the international level against Argentina. These cases were 
instituted for arbitration mostly at ICSID and a few at UNCITRAL. 
Awards were issued in about twelve cases, some on jurisdiction bases, while some were 
argued and decided. In most of these cases (for those cases that got to argument on the main 
claims); Argentina pleaded the defense of necessity
178
 as stipulated in some of its BITS
179
 or 
as an international customary law when it is not stipulated in the concerned BIT.  
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The defence of necessity
180
 is codified in Article 25 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Act. The necessity defense as a clause in BITs portrays 
exceptional instances where actions of the host state will not constitute a breach of the treaty.  
Necessity defence in ILC provides that a state will not be held to breach its international 
obligations if the action it takes is the only way to save an essential interest from imminent 
and grave peril, and it does not impair the essential interest of the state towards which such 
obligation exists. It also provides that a state cannot plead this law where the state has 
contributed to the state of necessity. In this paper, I would use the USA-Argentina BIT as an 
example.
181
 The exemption clause in this BIT provides that: 
“This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the 
maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance 
or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential 
security interests” 
Tribunals in deciding cases with this clause pleaded as defence, decides that this clause is not 
self judging.
182
 It needs to be analysed by a third party.  In analysing this defence, three 
positions have been taken by the tribunals. 
 The first position was the total rejection of the defence of necessity based on their inability to 
satisfy the conditions outlined by necessity in customary international law as codified in the 
ILC.  This was outlaid in CMS v. Argentina.
183
 An investor in the TGN (an Argentinean gas 
transportation company) instituted arbitration against Argentina for exploitation without 
compensation, breach of fair and equitable treatment, arbitrary and discriminatory measures 
and umbrella clause. The tribunal found that Argentina has breached the fair and equitable 
treatment and the umbrella clause (failure to observe their obligations) and rejected the plea of 
defence of necessity in article XI of the US-Argentina BIT.  The tribunal related the defence 
of necessity in Article XI to Customary international law of state of necessity and found 
Argentina cannot justify its actions based on both.  
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A couple of cases have been decided in this manner
184
 but some of the cases
185
 have been 
subjected to review by the annulment tribunal and found wanting. The CMS case was also 
appealed. The award was not cancelled but the annulment committee criticized the way the 
defense of necessity was interpreted especially in relation to the customary international law 
on state of necessity. 
The second position was outlined in LG&E v. Argentina 
186
 where the tribunal analysed the 
defence of necessity based on article XI of the US-Argentina exemption clause and the 
international customary law of defence of necessity. LG&E is a Kentucky based company that 
purchased interest in Three Gas Corporation in Argentina. It instituted action against the 
government for breach of treaty after the adjustment of the tariff. Argentina pleaded the same 
defence of necessity as found in the BIT and the international customary law. The tribunal 
analyse the defence based on both laws
187
and found that Argentina can be justified based on 
both laws. However, it differentiated the period of state of emergency in Argentina from the 
period that does not constitute an emergency period and held that Argentina is liable for the 
period that does not constitute a state where it is necessary to apply the emergency law. 
The third position is found in Continental Casualty& Co v. Argentina Award
188
 where an 
Illinous based company with investments in insurance company instituted arbitration against 
Argentina for damages based on loss incurred during her emergency measures. The tribunal in 
this case analysed the defence of necessity based on the Article XI. It held that the provision 
in The US- Argentina BIT is les specialis
189
 and held that the standard required in the two 
laws are different. The standard in the international customary law is restrictive while that of 
the BIT is wider. It also absolved Argentina from liability based on article XI in almost all the 
claims except one.   
In other cases where the BIT did not expressly preclude the state party from wrongfulness, 
just the international customary law on necessity was cited. Most probably, this defense might 
be used in all types of emergency. A lot of cases have been decided in this respect, not just in 
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investment issues. The International court of Justice (ICJ) has held that the provision should 
be interpreted narrowly and the conditions to be provided should be met cumulatively.
190
 In 
addition, the application of the state of necessity does not prevent the state relying on this 
provision from paying compensation where it is in line with the applicable law.
191
 
From the above cases, it is a bit difficult to predict the position a tribunal might take when it 
comes to preclusion from wrongfulness (exemption clause) especially when it is treaty based. 
Taking of different positions despite similarities in facts and issues have been the bane of the 
ICSID as an institution for arbitration. This unsettling issue will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  Nevertheless, from the decisions so far, the BOT investor might have to be 
responsible for the loss acquired during the period of emergency where the host state has been 
precluded from liability in the treaty. But the state can be held responsible where such 
measures were applied beyond the emergency period. When there is no provision for 
emergency in the treaty, the host state will have to meet the strict conditions outlined in the 
ILC and also pay compensation where it is necessary.
192
 From the above, the provision for 
emergency period in the BIT does not exactly favour the BOT investor in renewable energy. 
4. WHEN IT GOES WRONG: CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY ICSID 
The host state‟s court would normally adjudicate dispute between a foreign investor and the 
host state, where there is no agreement to the contrary. Foreign investors prefer to have an 
independent neutral body; because of fear of lack of impartiality and lack of independence 
between the judiciary and the executive arm of the host state. Even in developed countries 
where judiciary functions independent of the executive; the courts may tend to have sympathy 
towards its state policy. The IIA provides a neutral forum for settlement of dispute between 
the investor and the host state. This is done through reference to an arbitration forum in the 
investment Treaty.
193
 Most treaties usually have ICSID as arbitration forum. The ICSID is a 
convention with 148 state members.
194
 This chapter will consider the role of this body in 
investment dispute and its implication for BOT investors in renewable energy. 
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The project company in the BOT renewable energy sector made many contractual agreements 
with different actors. Causes of action could be: refusal to grant approval or license to 
operate; change in policies guaranteed in implementation agreement; actions constituting 
breach of the general treatment terms; or breach of contractual obligation. Most of these 
contracts do contain arbitration clause for settlement of dispute. The arbitration body 
contained in the clause could be national or international. For protection under the investment 
treaty, the investor will need to seek the forum referred to by the treaty.  Both the investor and 
the host state need to give consent to the arbitration. The host state consent can be given via a 
broad consent clause in a concession: through a standing offer in a treaty between the host 
state and the investor‟s nationality state or through a standing offer in the legislation of the 
host state.
195
 The investor is deemed to have accepted the offer when it initiates arbitration. 
The clauses establishing arbitration differ in the wordings. Some provides jurisdiction on 
certain specified cause of action. A good example of this is found in Norway – Russia BIT, 
where it was stated that arbitration will be only on disputes which arises from implementation 
or non-implementation of the obligation in the agreement.
196
 While in others there are no 
limitations on causes of action.
197
 For a BOT investor in renewable energy, treaties with 
specified action might make it difficult to bring in contractual breach claim under a treaty 
obligation. Moreover, diverse decisions made by tribunals on application of umbrella clause, 
create difficulty in accessing the feasibility of a tribunal accepting to arbitrate a treaty claim. 
This particular issue creates more difficulty for renewable investor with investments in on- 
grid energy. This is because what he has is myriads of contracts with governmental entities 
that are separate legal entities. Arbitral decisions have shown that arbitrators are more willing 
to accept jurisdiction when such entity is the state itself than when it is a separate legal 
entity.
198
 However, arbitrators are willing to adjudicate cases where the “contractual breach 
claim will constitute at the same time a violation of the bilateral treaty by the state”199 
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In some BITs, host states require that some conditions be met by the investors before 
initiating arbitration.
200
  Such conditions can be avoided through the MFN principle.
201
 The 
center has jurisdiction on dispute that arises out of investment.
202
 
ICSID also has an additional jurisdiction facility. This facility provides for cases where a 
party to a BIT is not a member state of the convention. It also takes cases that are not directly 
related to investment. 
ICSID has indeed provided a neutral forum for settlement of dispute thereby boosting the 
confidence of investors in state that are signatory to it. This is evident in that most of the 
treaties contain clauses allowing the parties to make use of its provision.  
However, the system is also clouded with its challenges and shortcomings.  The challenges 
and the way out are enunciated below. 
 
4.1. Lack of Consistency in ICSID Jurisprudence 
In ICSID, tribunals are not bound by decisions made in other decided cases.
203
 This has been 
evident in a number of decided cases where tribunals have chosen to make decisions different 
from previous similar cases.
204
 Example is the application of non-precluded measure in the 
USA-Argentina treaty where different decision was reached by tribunals in two cases with 
similar facts.
205
 Another example is interpretation of umbrella clause
206
and the extension of 
Most Favored Nation to dispute settlement.
207
  Consistency in jurisprudence is important to 
the legitimacy and growth of any legal regime. Inconsistency tends to reveal flaws in the 
structure of dispute resolution system (it shows that one decision is not legally correct); 
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thereby reducing the public‟s confidence in such system.208 Legal theory stipulates that rule of 
law is rule of law if it is consistently applied to be predictable.
209
 Investment law is at the 
early stage of development hence the need for consistency. The BITs between the two 
countries is to show the private investors the desire of the host country to protect their 
investments. However, the value of winning the confidence of investors will be reduced when 
there is no uniform interpretation of the content of such treaty terms. Lack of uniformity may 
reduce the willingness of investors to invest for a long time, which is the bane for BOT 
investors especially in renewable energy sector. A predictable jurisprudence helps to analyse 
the risk of embarking on an expensive dispute settlement process like ICSID. It is good to 
note that tribunals at ICSID have not been inconsistent in all legal issues. There has been 
consistency in distinction between treaty and contract claims and the interpretation of fair and 
equitable treatment to include need for stable legal and business framework.
210
 
 
4.2. Enforcement of ICSID Award 
Another major short coming of ICSID is the challenge being encountered by winning party in 
enforcing the award. ICSID convention provides that all states signatory to it should 
recognize a rendered award.
211
 However, it is not wise for the winning party to seek 
enforcement in the local courts. This is because the local courts are not independent enough to 
enforce awards against their state. Most states do not maintain large holdings outside their 
state and even when they do; it is via corporate instrumentality distinct from the state. In 
addition, where they had enough property, sovereignty immunity law might be a hindrance.
212
  
The enforcement of an award is based on the law of execution of judgment in the state where 
execution is sought. Article 55 of the convention provides that the law of immunity in the 
contracting state holds when an award is sought to be enforced. In other words, if the law of 
such contracting state prevents the enforcement of judgment against state property or that of 
the property of foreign state, the winning party will not be able to enforce the award.  
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Inability to enforce an award will definitely be a major disappointment to a BOT investor who 
has invested huge capital in renewable energy. This challenge almost negates the essence of 
BIT protection. It makes the BIT protection unreliable. 
However, it is good to note that this usually occur at the execution stage after the award has 
been recognized. Investors can minimize this challenge by getting an explicit waiver of 
immunity from the execution clause in the investment contract.  
Despite these challenges, ICSID still remain the most patronised international forum for 
dispute settlement. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
IIL provides substantial measure of protection for BOT investor in renewable energy via the 
substantive obligation contained in the investment treaties. Non-performance of assurances 
made in the implementation agreement can be brought under the fair and equitable treatment. 
IIL protections found in the investment treaties might not shield BOT investors against tax 
increase. This sector is excluded from the areas protected by most treaties.  But other 
unilateral changes can be adjudicated. Arbitrators adjudicate on contractual claims that 
constituting a treaty violation.  Umbrella clauses provide an avenue to bring in contractual 
breaches under the treaty protection. Right to transfer to transfer profits in hard currency to 
home country is guaranteed. It also provides for investor- state arbitration of disputes. In case 
of emergency, changes due to necessity also demands that compensation be paid to the 
investors provided the IIA governing the investment did not make any provision otherwise. 
However, cases at the ICSID are adjudicated based on the fact of each case. This gives 
leverage to the investor in instances where precedent has not been in favour of his claim. 
In times of emergency where changes are necessary, the customary law protection (necessity 
principle) is more favourable to a BOT investor. This is because where such instances are 
provided in the IIA; it is usually the investor who bears the liability. However, such changes 
can be arbitrated if they are applied beyond the emergency period. Investors should also note 
that the protections do not guarantee a risk free regime. Some of the protections are not 
absolute in themselves. 
In conclusion, the fact that a host state is a party to an investment treaty (either bilateral or 
multilateral) gives a measure of assurance to renewable energy investor, because the latter can 
still recoup a measure of its capital via the award granted by arbitrators.   
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